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 Technical Innovations 
Location and Product Bundling in the provision of WiFi 
Albert EFIMOV & Jason WHALLEY 
Department of Management Science, Strathclyde Business School, Glasgow 
WiFi promises to revolutionise how and where we access the internet. As 
WiFi networks are rolled out around the globe, access to the internet will no 
longer be through fixed networks or unsatisfactory mobile phone 
connections. Instead access will be through low cost wireless networks at 
speeds of up to 11Mbps. It is hard not to be impressed by the enthusiasm 
with which WiFi has been embraced. GREEN, ROSENBUSH, CROKETT & 
HOLMES (2003) assert that WiFi is a disruptive technology akin to telephones 
in the 1920s and network computers in the 1990s. WiFi is seen as both an 
opportunity in its own right, as well as an enabler of opportunities for others. 
Computer manufacturers are hoping that WiFi will increases sales of their 
laptops, whilst Microsoft feels that WiFi will result in users upgrading their 
operating systems to Windows XP.  
Numerous retailers have also jumped onto the WiFi bandwagon, with 
perhaps the most prominent of these being Starbucks. Hoteliers, fast food 
restaurant chains and airport operators have all either launched or 
announced their intention of launching WiFi networks. A key feature of these 
companies and their involvement with WiFi is that they control a location 
whose use they want to further through the provision of WiFi.  
Some, such as the SHOSTEK Group (2003a) have, however, questioned 
the commercial viability of WiFi. They argue that the lack of economies of 
scale and coverage, debatable quality of service and the heightened price 
sensitivity of subscribers conspire to squeeze margins, raising the question 
of whether WiFi service providers will ever make a profit from their 
investment. Given these doubts, this paper seeks to understand why three 
companies have sought to provide WiFi.  
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WiFi, WLAN & WISP  
WiFi stands for Wireless Fidelity, the name of a certification programme 
run by the Wireless Enhancement Compatibility Alliance and is the popular 
name for the wireless Ethernet 802.11b standard for WLAN (wireless local 
area networks). The basic principle of a WLAN resembles that of a cellular 
network – access points broadcast and receive signals over a short distance 
from users equipped with a network interface card. In this case, the short 
distance is up to 100m. The access point is physically connected to the fixed 
network and acts as an intermediary that relays traffic between the fixed and 
wireless networks. The concentrated area around an access point where 
high speed WLAN access is available is commonly referred to as a ‘hotspot'. 
Within this hotspot, 802.11b is capable of delivering 5 to 6 Mb/s of 
bandwidth. This is, however, less than the nominal bandwidth of 11Mb/s that 
is associated with 802.11b. 
WiFi WLANs operate in license exempt spectrum bands such as 2.4GHz. 
This means that potentially anyone can build a WLAN as no specific 
frequency allocation process occurs. However, this lack of licensing is not 
without its problems. 802.11b supports only three channels in any one 
location within 100m of one another; with the result that if more than three 
networks overlap interference will occur. Interference will reduce access 
speeds and may ultimately prevent access. Moreover, 802.11b is also 
susceptible to interference from other electronic equipment such as 
Bluetooth enabled mobile phones and cordless telephones.  
Networks can occur on a variety of geographical scales. Personal area 
networks are the smallest geographically and occur when, for example, 
individuals use Bluetooth. Geographically larger networks include local area 
networks (LANs), of which WiFi is an example. LANs are to be found within 
buildings such as apartment blocks or university dormitories. Metropolitan 
area networks (MANs) are the next scale up of network and use 
technologies like xDSL to deliver high-speed data services. Finally, there are 
also wide area networks (WANs) that connect users across cities, countries 
and increasingly across continents.  
Wireless Internet Services Providers (WISPs) are organisations that 
provide internet services using WiFi as an access technology. These 
wireless technologies in turn connect to fixed the technologies that lie at the 
heart of LANs, MANs and WANs. WISPs can be differentiated by their scale 
as well as their relationships with the venues where they provide internet 
access. WISPs can provide internet access in one, a handful or many 
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locations and may have a co-operative or uncooperative relationship with the 
venue.  
Three illustrations of WiFi provision 
Starbucks/T-Mobile 
Starbucks' involvement with WiFi dates from early 2001 when a strategic 
deal with MobileStar, Microsoft, IBM and Compaq was announced providing 
Starbucks with broadband access in the form of hotspots across the USA 
(SHOSTEK Group, 2002b: 13). In exchange for exclusivity and all the revenues 
generated, MobileStar took sole responsibility for the deployment of hotspots 
in Starbucks' cafes.  
The results of this strategic deal were mixed. MobileStar was able to 
expand its business model – supplying connectivity – into new market: WiFi 
enabled coffee drinkers. Market research, conducted by Starbucks, indicated 
that 54% of its customers would pay for in store wireless access and that 
91% of customers expressed an interest in in-store connectivity (SAUDERS, 
2002). The increased loyalty engendered by WiFi was also highlighted, with 
customers reporting an increased propensity to visit Starbucks, as well as 
the value that they placed on the convenience of being able to access the 
internet, check e-mail etc. 
The deal also highlighted the unique and significant cost structure of 
hotspots. Associated with each hotspot are three types of costs: sunk, fixed 
and operating. A hotspot can cost up to USD 4,000 to install (KOERNER, 
2002). To the cost of the installed equipment must be added the cost of a T1 
line to each of the hotspots. The cost of each T1 line can vary between USD 
400 and USD 900 per month (BEAUMONT & ROBERTS, 2002: 4).  
MobileStar agreed to roll out hotspots virtually simultaneously in 550 
cafes. Given the aforementioned sunk and fixed costs, it is no surprise that 
this called for a considerable upfront investment. However, subsequent 
revenues and customer numbers were modest. Customers typically paid 
USD 3 for 15 minutes, whilst accesses totalled approximately 20,000 per 
month (SAUDERS, 2002). The combination of high up front costs and low 
revenues resulted in MobileStar's bankruptcy in October 2001. 
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This did not mark the end of Starbucks' involvement with WiFi. 
Voicestream (later T-Mobile) acquired MobileStar for a reputed USD 1.5 
million in late 2001. T-Mobile not only acquired all of MobileStar's assets, but 
also purchased the right to assume many of its contracts. T-Mobile launched 
its WiFi service for Starbucks in August 2002. Customers were able to 
access the hotspots through an initial 24hr free trial, after which subscription 
charges were incurred. The service plans offered are outlined below. 
Table 1: T-Mobile hotspot service subscriptions plans at launch in August 2002 
Subscription plan Cost 
 (in USD) 
Cost per minute
(in USD) 
Additional package details 
Pay as you go 15 
minutes 
2.5 0.16  
Flat rate monthly 
unlimited local 
access 
29.99 N/A 500 MB data traffic 
NBED rate for minutes outside 
of specified local area 
Additional data transfer at /MB 
Flat rate monthly 
unlimited national 
access 
49.99 N/A 500 MB data traffic 
Additional data transfer at /MB  
Prepaid 120 minute 20 0.16  
Prepaid 300 minute 50 0.16  
Source: Efimov, 2002 
In order to encourage use of its infrastructure by paying subscribers, T-
Mobile prevented subscribers of other WiFi networks from accessing its 
hotspots. This would seem to suggest that T-Mobile recognised the 
importance of revenue generation and that it did not want to follow 
MobileStar in failing to support its business model through insufficient 
revenues. 
Since its launch T-Mobile has made two important changes to its hotspot 
services. Firstly, T-Mobile has continued to expand the number of hotspots 
offered. T-Mobile now operates 4321 hotspots across the USA. Secondly, it 
has changed its subscription plans. Prices have been reduced. For example, 
the cost of the unlimited national plan has been reduced to USD 29.99 
though subscribers need to join for a minimum of one year. Pay as you go 
plans have also been changed, with the cost of an initial hour falling from 
USD 10 to USD 6. T-Mobile has also removed the limits on data transfer as 
well. According to T-Mobile, these changes were motivated by a desire to 
widen the potential market as well as respond to existing customers who 
found the subscription plans too complex. Consumption patterns have been 
affected. T-Mobile saw a fourfold increased in usage (IWATANI, 2003) though 
the average time online remained static at 45 minutes per user. 
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Copenhagen airport 
Copenhagen airport is one of Europe's largest airports. The airport's 
involvement with WiFi has been motivated by three desires. Firstly, by a 
need to offset declining payphone revenues through the development of new 
services (SØE, 2002). Mobile telephones, which provide the airport with no 
revenues, have replaced pay phones as the principal mechanism through 
which travellers communicate.  
Secondly, by the need to improve customer satisfaction among a key 
group of travellers, namely, business travellers. The range and quality of 
telecommunications services available at the airport will contribute to its 
overall ranking in airport league tables. Thirdly, checking in for a flight 
ensures that travellers are at the airport at least one hour before they fly. 
The time prior to boarding the flight is viewed by many as 'dead time' where 
the separation of the traveller from their office substantially reduces the 
amount of work and efficiency with which work is undertaken. WiFi would 
reduce the amount of 'dead time' through providing a link to the traveller's 
office.  
The airport was not unfamiliar with LANs, as it operated both wired and 
wireless LANs for its own needs. As a consequence, the commercial offering 
of WiFi services only required the upgrading of existing hard and software 
and not a complete installation (SØE, 2002). Not only did this reduce the cost 
of providing WiFi services, it also reduced the time between taking the 
decision to offer such services and actually being in a position to do so. The 
use of existing infrastructures ensured that WiFi installation took two weeks.  
The airport funded infrastructure upgrading itself. As a result, no outside 
WISPs were used. Although this could be viewed as an unusual decision on 
the part of the airport, several benefits flowed from it. The existing 
infrastructure and dedicated internet connection could be used, thereby 
reducing costs. Security concerns would be alleviated, as no outside party 
had to connect with the airport's existing infrastructure and the airport could 
dictate the location of the hotspots. Finally, conflicts of interest were also 
avoided. 
This should not be taken, however, to mean that the airport rolled out its 
WiFi service completely independently of other companies. Aptilo Networks 
provided a series of inputs – billing, authorisation etc – that enabled the 
airport to deploy WiFi. Accessing the wireless internet zone at the airport is 
relatively straightforward. The user requires a WiFi enabled device such as a 
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laptop and when their browser is activated they are redirected to the wireless 
internet zone homepage where authorisation and payment occurs. 
Subscribers to ipass, which offers global roaming services to its members, 
do not pay and are directly logged on. Those subscribers who are not 
members of ipass need to pay, through either a credit card or a TDC scratch 
card. Subscription costs vary from DKK40 for 30minutes to DKK80 for 
240minutes. Access from within the SAS lounges is free. 
The airport has recognised the importance of roaming between WiFi 
locations. As a member of ipass, roaming is now possible. It has recently 
been suggested that roaming agreements with other location controllers, 
fellow airport operating companies or hotels for instance, are being 
investigated by the airport.  
Telia HomeRun 
At the end of 1999 Telia launched its HomeRun service with three 
hotspots. Since then the number of hotspots has rapidly increased, with 450 
operating by early 2004. Significantly, these hotspots have not been 
indiscriminately sited, but instead are focused where the target market, 
business travellers, are to be found. Hotspots are to be found in hotels, 
airports, conference venues etc, namely in venues frequented by business 
travellers.    
Why has HomeRun focused on business travellers? In essence the 
services provided by HomeRun extends the working day and widens the 
range of locations where work may occur. As both of these are prized by 
business travellers who are prepared to pay a premium to enjoy them. By 
emphasising the quality of service offered, HomeRun has sought to justify its 
prices, which are higher than those charged by competitors.  
The strategy adopted by HomeRun has changed over time. Prices have 
declined and HomeRun has been bundled with other products offered by 
Telia. The first of these is illustrated in table 2, which shows that the initial 
start up fee has been drastically reduced. More recently prices have 
increased slightly, suggesting that either the market is not as competitive as 
initially thought or that HomeRun is seeking to position itself as a premium 
service provider.  
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Table 2: Subscription costs, Telia HomeRun 
Price from 1st October 2002 Subscription 
plan 
Price until  
30th September 2002 
Non-GSM subscribers GSM subscribers 
Flat rate Initial fee 495 SEK, 
2495 SEK/month 
1495SEK / month 1395SEK / month 
Base monthly 
contract 
495 SEK initial fee, 
300 SEK / month & 
2.4SEK per min traffic 
fee 
200SEK initial fee, 
150SEK / month & 
2.4SEK per min traffic 
fee 
200SEK initial fee, 
40SEK / month, 




N/A 150SEK monthly fee 
& 2.4SEK per min 
traffic fee 
40SEK / month, 
2SEK per minute 
traffic fee 
Source: EFIMOV, 2002 
Table 2 also highlights the bundling together of WiFi and mobile services. 
Through locking together the two services customers are less likely to move 
to another service provider and the financial incentives may encourage 
those cellular subscribers who would not otherwise be interested in WiFi to 
opt for the service.   
Discussion 
What do the above cases tell us about WiFi deployment? Our starting 
point here is that the deployment of WiFi networks is not as straightforward 
as we are often led to believe, with a whole host of factors affecting its 
economic and operational attractiveness. These in turn lead us to conclude 
that those presently investing in WiFi networks are unlikely to see a 
commercial return on their investment. 
The first factor limiting the attractiveness of WiFi networks is the lack of 
economies of scale in their construction. Although the cost of each hotspot is 
relatively modest, their separateness from one another ensures that each 
time the full investment of is required. This is not to say that no savings are 
possible, as some will undoubtedly occur through the repeated installation of 
hotspots, but that these will be negligible when compared to the overall 
costs. 
A second limiting factor is the number of simultaneous users that each 
hotspot can support. The evidence to date, albeit often anecdotal, suggests 
that the number of simultaneous users, each enjoying sufficiently fast access 
rates, is limited to two or three heavy users. Access speeds are particularly 
prone to deterioration if one or two of the simultaneous users are 
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undertaking bandwidth intensive activities such as watching video clips. In 
other words, a high number of simultaneous users will degrade the quality of 
service that each experiences as they are sharing the same bandwidth.  
The significance of this should not be underestimated. Firstly, it means 
that if a reasonable level of quality is to be maintained, less revenue will be 
generated as the maximum number of simultaneous users is lower than 
would otherwise be the case. Secondly, additional investment is needed if 
each hotspot were to support more simultaneous users at a reasonable level 
of service quality.  
Together these factors undermine the economic rationale for investing in 
WiFi networks. The lack of economies of scale increase the cost of building 
a network of WiFi hotspots, which, in turn, means that subscription charges 
are higher than would otherwise be the case. Network operators cannot 
maximise their revenue streams through increasing the number of 
simultaneous subscribers, because if more than a handful of subscribers 
access the hotspot simultaneously access speeds decline and quality 
deteriorates.  
If there are limited, if any, financial returns to be made from the operation 
of WiFi hotspots, why do companies provide such a service? One 
explanation is to achieve product complementarities. Through the provision 
of hotspots at its cafes, Starbucks hopes that sales of its core products – 
coffee and cake – will be increased. As many of its cafes are largely empty 
during large parts of the working day, the provision of WiFi, which allows 
users to work whilst being outside their place of work, will generate sales 
when none would otherwise occur. A second related motive is for Starbucks 
to differentiate its cafes in an increasingly competitive and crowed 
marketplace. Starbucks pioneered the introduction of WiFi hotspots, and 
although other cafe chains have since launched their own WiFi hotspot 
services, in the minds of many Starbucks cafes are forever associated with 
WiFi. Thus, there is a marketing advantage to be gained from the provision 
of WiFi hotspots. 
But are these motives shared by T-Mobile? T-Mobile does accrue 
marketing advantages from its association with Starbucks, and these should 
not be underestimated. The national scale of hotspot provision by T-Mobile, 
and the large amount of press attention that its relationship with Starbucks 
received, helped raise awareness of its brand in the marketplace.  
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Does T-Mobile share the other motives of Starbucks?  No. T-Mobile is 
motivated by a desire to increase its revenues through the provision of 
wireless telecommunication services, of which WiFi is just one example. By 
contrast, Starbucks is motivated by a desire to enhance the attractiveness of 
its cafes to increase consumption of its core products. The quality of service 
experienced by users is not as important for Starbucks as it is for T-Mobile. 
For Starbucks, WiFi is complementary to its core service, whilst for T-Mobile 
it is a core service. Thus, given the technological limitations of WiFi, 
Starbucks will favour more simultaneous users than T-Mobile as 
consumption of coffee will rise. This would, of course, significantly impact the 
quality of service experienced by users to the detriment of T-Mobile. 
There is also a difference between Telia HomeRun's motives and the 
locations where it has installed hotspots. Many hotels and conference 
centres have been persuaded to install a hotspot in their premises for fear of 
losing customers, rather than by a desire to attract new customers. In other 
words, the installation is part of a defensive strategy that aims to remove the 
presence of a hotspot as a differentiating factor. What evidence is available 
supports this conclusion; as many of the locations served have generated 
little, if any, revenue from their WiFi services. 
If the various locations have sought to remove WiFi as a differentiator in 
their respective markets, then Telia HomeRun has sought to use WiFi to 
'lock in' its customers to existing mature services such as GSM. Although 
WiFi is offered as a standalone product, the pricing regime offered 
encourages its combination with the mobile services offered by Telia. 
Copenhagen airport falls awkwardly between the two other cases. The 
airport controls a key location and has sought partnerships with other 
companies to advantageously leverage its control over this location. These 
partnerships have facilitated the development of the WiFi network across the 
airport, making the airport more attractive to travellers in the process. It does 
not, however, rely to the same extent as Starbucks, or the locations in the 
case of Telia HomeRun, on other companies for the provision of WiFi as it 
made extensive use of its existing infrastructure. This is not to say that no 
business relationships exist, but rather than the airport is the dominant 
partner in the relationships.  
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Conclusion 
In this paper we have identified the different motivations underlying WiFi 
provision in three different cases. We surmise that these different and 
diverging motivations are sufficiently strong enough to undermine the 
partnerships that exists between Starbucks and T-Mobile and Telia 
HomeRun and its location owners. These partnerships will collapse when it 
emerges that the underlying aims of the various partners are, in the medium 
to long term, incompatible. However, in the shorter term, the partnerships 
make sense as they enable each company to strive towards achieving their 
strategic objectives. 
Copenhagen Airport stands in stark contrast to the other two examples. 
Its ambitions appear to be more measured than in the other two cases, 
limited to the provision of WiFi services within a single location. Moreover, its 
substantial use of its own existing infrastructure ensures that it does not 
need to align its interests with those of its partners for they are effectively 
providing inputs to meet its needs. As a result, the tensions that will 
eventually tear the other partnerships apart are largely missing in the case of 
Copenhagen airport.  
It is therefore suggested here that those companies whose ambitions are 
limited, who themselves control the location where WiFi services are 
provided and dominate the necessary business relationships, will be the 
players who prosper. They may not make a financial return on their 
investment, but they will remove WiFi as a differentiating factor in the 
marketplace and attract key customers to use their location in the process. 
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